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課程名稱 |
法律的經濟分析專題
SPECIAL TOPICS ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW |
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開課學期 |
95-2 |
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授課對象 |
社會科學院 國家發展研究所 |
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授課教師 |
周治邦 |
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課號 |
NtlDev5161 |
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課程識別碼 |
341 U7660 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
2 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
必修 |
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上課時間 |
星期二7,8(14:20~16:20) |
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上課地點 |
國發206 |
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備註 |
總人數上限：30人 |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
本課程尚未建立核心能力關連 |
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課程大綱
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課程概述 |
This course has two goals. First, to introduce the formal tools of modern game theory by using a number of classic legal problems ranging from tort and contract law to labor law, environmental regulations, and antitrust. Second, to show how modern game theory allows us to sharpen our intuitions and provides us with new ways of looking at familiar problems. The main textbooks for this course are “Game Theory and the Law” by Baird, Gertner and Picker (B&G&P for abbreviation) and “Games of Strategy” by Dixit and Skeath (D&S for abbreviation).
This course requires mathematics only at the senior high school level such as linear algebra. Accordingly, this course welcomes students majoring in any field. Grades for this course are based on the following criteria: Problem Sets (10%), Mid-Term Exam (40%), and Final Exam (50%).
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課程目標 |
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課程要求 |
Course Schedule:
Week 1: “Economic Analysis of Law” by Kaplow and Shavell in Auerbach and Feldstein ed. (2002).
This is a comprehensive survey paper.
Weeks 2, 3, and 4: B&G&P Chapter 1 (Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game), and D&S Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 5.
Provide an example, i.e., the tort rules governing an accident involving a motorist and a pedestrian.
Introduce games such as the stag hunt, the prisoner’s dilemma, and matching pennies, and show that how these games can be applied to legal problems.
Weeks 5, 6, and 7: B&G&P Chapter 2 (Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game), and D&S Chapters 3 and 6.
Introduce incomplete information and subgame perfection.
Weeks 8 and 9: B&G&P Chapter 5 (Reputation and Repeated Games), and D&S Chapter 8.
Examine how legal rules may affect parties who interact with each other over time.
Investigate issues regarding Statute of Frauds, tacit collusion, and predatory pricing.
Week 10: Midterm Exam
Weeks 11 and 12: B&G&P Chapter 6 (Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models), and D&S Chapter 11.
Explore issues regarding the mechanism design, network externalities, and herd behavior.
Weeks 13: B&G&P Chapter 3 (Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation), and D&S Chapter 12.
Examine issues regarding unraveling, signaling and screening, and renegotiation of contracts.
Week 14 and 15: B&G&P Chapter 4 (Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information), and Gibbons Chapter 4.
Introduce the beer-quiche game (i.e., intuitive criteria), plant closing laws, and Disabilities Act.
Week 16: B&G&P Chapter 7 (Noncooperative Bargaining), and D&S Chapter 16.
Introduce the Nash bargaining solution.
Explore how the breach problem (in contract law) can be seen as a bargaining game.
Week 17: B&G&P Chapter 8 (Bargaining and Information), and D&S Chapter 17.
Introduce two-sided private information into a model of bifurcated trials.
Week 18: Final Exam
Lecture Note
Strategic games: interactions between mutually aware players.
Decisions: action situations where each person can choose without concern for actions or responses from others.
Unless there are two or more players, each of whom responds to what others do, it is not a game.
Classifying games
Sequential vs. simultaneous
The game of economic competition among rival firms in a market has a first-mover advantage if one firm, by making a firm commitment to compete aggressively, can get its rivals to back off. But in political competition, a candidate who has taken a firm stand on an issue may give his rivals a clear focus for their attack ads, and the game has a second-mover advantage.
Zero-sum vs. none-zero-sum
Is the game played once or repeatedly, and with the same or changing opponents?
A game may be zero-sum in the short run but have scope for mutual benefit in the long run.
Do the players have full or equal information?
The general principle here is that you want to release your information selectively.
Your opponents can be convinced only by objective evidence or by actions that are credible proof of your information. Such actions on the part of the more-informed player are called signals, and strategies that use them are called signaling. Conversely, the less-informed party can create situations in which the more-informed player will have to take some action that credibly reveals his information; such strategies are called screening, and the methods they use are called screening devices.
Are the rules of the game fixed or manipulable?
Are agreements to cooperate enforceable?
Games in which joint-action agreements are enforceable are called cooperative.
Individuals must be allowed to act in their own interests are called noncooperative.
Strategies are simply the choices available to the players.
Rational behavior means that each has a consistent set of rankings (values or payoffs) over all the logically possible outcomes, and calculates the strategy that best serves these interests.
Strictly speaking, the rules of the game consist of (1) the list of players, (2) the strategies available to each player, (3) the payoffs of each player for all possible combinations of strategies pursued by all the players, and (4) the assumption that each player is a rational maximizer.
Equilibrium simply means that each player is using the strategy that is the best response to the strategies of the other players.
Evolutionary approach: any individual animal’s genes strongly influence its behavior. Each player comes to the game with a particular strategy “hardwired” or “programmed” in.
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
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參考書目 |
Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randal Picker, 1994, Game Theory and the Law, Harvard University Press.
2. Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, 2004, Law and Economics, 4th ed., Addison-Wesley(雙葉書局總經銷，中文翻譯係第三版，書名為法律經濟學，民國92年由華泰書局出版).
3. Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, 1991, Thinking Strategically, New York: Norton & Company（中文翻譯書名為大謀略，牛頓出版社.
4. Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath, 2004, Games of Strategy, New York: Norton & Company （華泰書局總經銷，中文翻譯係第一版，書名為策略的賽局，民國91年由弘智文化出版）.
5. David Friedman, 2000, Law’s Order, Princeton University Press （中文翻譯書名為經濟學與法律的對話，民國91年由先覺出版）.
6. Robert Gibbons, 1992, Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press.
7. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “Economic Analysis of Law,” in Alan Auerbach and Martin Feldstein (ed.), 2002, Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. 3, 1661-1784. North Holland.
8. Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, 2005, Freaknomics, William Morrow.
9. James Miller, 2003, Game Theory At Work, The MacGraw-Hill Companies, Inc(中文翻譯書名為洞悉商場賽局，民國92年由其台灣分公司出版).
10. Barry J. Nalebuff and Adam A. Brandenburger, 1996, Co-opetition, Doubleday, New York (中文翻譯書名為競合策略，民國93年由台灣培生教育出版).
11. Richard Posner, 2003, Economic Analysis of Law, Aspen Publishers.
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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